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Soup, Justice and Workplace Democracy:
The Columbia Conserve Company,
1917-19431

Kenneth D. Colburn, Jr.
Butler University

A Commitment to Industrial Democracy
The Columbia Conserve Company, located at 1735
Churchman Avenue (at the Belt Railway) on the south side of
2
Indianapolis from 1912 to 1953, employed some 200 workers at
its height. Its business activity was canning tomato, chicken
noodle, and other varieties of soups, and related items such as
pork and beans, tomato juice, and catsup. Yet if soup was the
main product at Columbia, justice in the workplace was its
primary purpose or sine qua non. Under the leadership of its
president, William P. Hapgood, and the cooperation of several
members of his family who owned the company, a
comprehensive experiment in industrial democracy was
launched at Columbia that endured for a quarter of a century
from 1917 to 1943. During this period of time, Columbia received
national and international recognition for such innovative
achievements as: a workers' council which managed the
company; a profit,-sharing and stock trust plan that resulted in
majority ownership of the company by employees; and various
workers' benefits such as free comprehensive health coverage, a
pension plan, and sickness and disability pay.
Speaking on January 6, 1920, at the Annual Meeting of
Stockholders, which included employees, Hapgood, made
reference to the fact that Columbia had just completed the thirtysecond month of its "experiment in employee management." He
emphasized that the experiment had produced, if nothing else,
the important achievement of eliminating "ill-will from our
business." Stating his belief that such antagonism "between
employees and employers is almost entirely responsible today
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for our industrial ills" Hapgood went on to observe that the
reason such ill-will had been vanquished from Columbia was due
to the fact that the company was "operating on the best principle
of life, that is, justice." Proposing that two members of the Board
of Directors, in a departure from previous practice, be elected
from the rank and file during elections later that evening,
Hapgood defended his proposal by reference to this same
"principle of justice" and the need for "some means by which the
voice of any individual employee, no matter what his rank, can
carry through any opposition to the final control of the business. .
. ."
Hapgood (1934, p.4) was more articulate about this concept
of workplace justice in a pamphlet about Columbia's experiment
written some years later in which he argued that justice has to do
with a recognition of the right of workers no less than that of
owners/managers to share equally in the decision-making
process:
Just as in political government, the making of laws is a
human right and not an economic right, so in industrial
government the control and direction of business should be
vested in the industrial citizens, the workers. These laws
should deal with all matters concerning those who work. Not
only would the workers determine the length of time they
should work, but they would also determine their incomes,
their share of the total production, choose their own
associates and release them, elect their own leaders,
promote and demote them, and decide upon all the policies
of the business.
While the above proposition would have struck many people in
Hapgood’s time and, indeed, our own period today as a nonsequitur, nonsensical viewpoint at best—and as an extreme,
radical and subversive idea at worse—it was not a political or
revolutionary position, let alone trade union labor politics, in the
ordinary sense of those words that Hapgood was here
espousing. For Hapgood, the idea of industrial democracy was
simply a logical, self-evident extension and progression of the
American political culture, rooted in democratic values and
norms, to the industrial setting. Justice in the workplace, just as
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in government and political affairs, meant the elimination of
autocratic decision-making power, based on the somewhat
arbitrary privilege of ownership, in favor of democratic decisionmaking based on the right of all who are subject to such
decisions to participate in the process. As Hapgood (1934, p. 6)
wrote: "In a genuine democracy each one of us must have the
opportunity to share in making decisions as to the rules under
which we live together."
Yet while justice and democracy in the workplace was
viewed by Hapgood as good and desirable for its own sake, he
also emphasized that industrial democracy was vastly superior to
its counterparts in promoting industrial efficiency. Industrial
democracy was superior not only because it reflected American
ideals of democracy, equality and justice; it was also superior
because of its great utility in promoting organizational efficiency.
Hapgood made this point clear in a speech he gave at the 1920
Annual Meeting of the company when he observed that
workplace democracy eliminates "enormous waste" and
"inefficiency." The key to avoiding what Hapgood called the
"waste of brains," for example, and having "men and women in
industry using their minds" on their jobs and in their work, is for
them to have the "correct attitude toward the business." Yet in
order for such an attitude to exist on the part of the worker it
cannot be imposed externally from the outside; it must be
voluntarily accepted and validated by the worker if workers are to
strive to make themselves into "efficiency expert(s)." Workplace
democracy was desirable for Hapgood because, rooted in the
principle of justice and equality for all workers, it encouraged the
individual worker to perceive his or her self-interest as being
advanced when the business itself is advanced. The legitimacy
of decisions arrived at collectively through a democratic process
was thereby enhanced, increasing the likelihood of worker
acceptance and compliance with those decisions. As Hapgood
(1934, p. 34) later wrote: "When a group of people have authority
to make the rules by which they live and labor, they will nearly
always abide by those rules." In the language of modem
sociology (Blumberg, 1968), worker alienation is reduced and
worker satisfaction, commitment and productivity are enhanced
through workplace democracy.
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Hapgood (1920, p. 12) was critically engaging and decisively
rejecting Taylorism, the industrial efficiency model prevalent in
his era. As Hapgood saw it, Taylor's so-called scientific
management approach to the workplace was flawed because it
failed to get at the root cause of worker productivity:
You will recall that a man named Taylor made a great name
for himself by what he called efficiency work. In my judgment
he began at the wrong end; he went at it in the wrong
manner. He tried to get increased efficiency by decreasing
the amount of movement made by the employees, by putting
in his watch system, by putting on tests... I do not think any
efficiency movement will result satisfactorily unless the
desire comes from the foundation -- from the men and
women working in the factory. If you WANT to be efficient
you will be. If you wait for some of us above you to force you
into efficiency, you will not be.
Taylor approached the problem of worker efficiency externally,
from the outside, as a technical matter to be solved
administratively through a specification of the right organization
of the work task. Hapgood instead approached the issue of
worker productivity as a socio-political problem involving
recourse to such fundamental principles as justice and
democratic organization. Just as Hapgood viewed the rank-andfile worker as a social and political being with more or less the
same basic needs, if not always the same talents, as the
3
"technician" (supervisory, professional staff), he likewise
4
viewed the factory as a socio-political entity and challenge.
Hapgood believed he understood better than Taylor what it
would take to have workers identify with the business and to
exemplify the same kind of commitment and dedication on the
job as shown by owners, management, and other "technicians"
(professionals). What it would take, Hapgood (1934, p, 4)
reasoned, is nothing less and nothing more than applying the
American solution to government to the sphere of business and
the establishment of industrial democracy. The solution seemed
perhaps self-evident or obvious to Hapgood: "Government of
the workers, by the workers, for the workers."
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It is interesting to note, with regard to worker efficiency at
Columbia, the conclusions of a contemporary, Paul H. Douglas
(1922/23, pp. 22-25), who had studied Columbia: “On the
whole...there seems to be more than substantial justification for
Mr. Hapgood's belief that the company has fared better with the
plan than without it...because it has resulted in the workers
putting their best efforts and intelligence into developing the
business." Douglas offered several examples of labor-saving
devices created by employees: an automatic feed on the catsupfilling machine conveyor belt, a low-level vat in the kitchen from
which soup ingredients are pumped into large kettles several feet
above the floor, and an automatic process for cleaning chicken
soup cans of fatty drippings after being filled. As further evidence
of worker efficiency, Douglas (1926, pp. 39-40) cited the "eager
and inventive spirit" reflected in Columbia's success in canning
chop suey, which its rivals could not duplicate. He likewise
reported that hourly output in 1922 was 46% higher than the
1918 average, and in 1924 it was 78% above that of 1918.
It is worth noting that Hapgood’s emphasis on the principle
of workplace democracy sharply differentiated him from the
mainstream of labor no less than that of the business world of his
time. Two examples may be cited to illustrate this point. First,
Samuel Gompers (1920, p. 286), to alleviate the apprehension of
business leaders in his advocacy of collective bargaining,
opposed precisely the kind of worker control and participation put
forward by Hapgood:
“Collective bargaining does not imply that wage earners shall
assume control of industry, or responsibility for financial
management... there is no belief held in the trade unions that its
members shall control the plant or usurp the rights of owners.”
Second, the American Federation of Labor in 1925 fully
endorsed Taylor's system of scientific management. In so doing
it embraced the basic philosophical tenets of Taylorism, which
involved viewing the issue of industrial efficiency according to a
rather narrowly defined technical perspective that excluded a
concern with such fundamental humanistic issues as justice and
democratic decision-making for workers in the workplace.
Consistent with this philosophy, in fact, the A.F.L. rejected an
application by Columbia for a union charter, as reflected in the
following letter of November 12, 1932, from William Green,
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President, American Federation of Labor, to the Columbia
Conserve Company: “the conclusion reached by the Executive
Council was adverse to the proposal, as...the relations between
the Company and its employees are not the relations of
employer with its employees, paid a stipulated wage per day or
per week, but the employees are stockholders in the Company
5
and are not paid on a wage working basis.” The American labor
and trade union leadership, ironically yet perhaps not
surprisingly, found itself in the position of rejecting one of the
more progressive strands of the American nascent labor
movement of the early twentieth century. Organized labor
apparently had no more stomach for democracy in the
workplace than did the mainstream business community.
Neither fish nor fowl, the Columbia Conserve Company, with
its commitment to social justice in the workplace, did not fit into
either the trade unionism or the capitalism of its day. The
message was clear: Columbia along with the precious few other
businesses organized around the principle of democracy, would
be isolated from both traditional business and labor and would
have to sink or swim, make it or perish, pretty much on its own.
The Early Years: 1917-1924
While Columbia had been in business for several years prior
to the beginning of its experiment in workplace democracy, it
was not until 1917 that it had produced a significant profit. Due in
part to this financial success, the pro-worker sentiment of the
firm's major owners, William P. Hapgood's mother and brothers,
and the urging of Columbia's president, William P. Hapgood
himself, Columbia took several important steps toward
establishing democracy at the business in the period 1917-1924.
These included: (1) a workers' council which was responsible for
managing the business, (2) a profit-sharing plan for workers, and
(3) employee representation on the Board of Directors.
Workers' control and involvement in managing Columbia
began in 1917 with the creation of a leadership Committee
consisting of ten persons, seven of whom were elected factory
representatives and three others who were appointed by the
6
owners. The Committee had all managerial authority, subject
7
only to the Board of Directors, over policy and operations for the
company. During the first year only, William P. Hapgood had the
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right of veto over any of the Committee's decisions and, in later
8
years, this veto power was extended to the Board of Directors.
In theory this Committee, and later the Council which replaced it,
decided all matters by a simple majority vote, but in practice this
body often sought to arrive at a consensus on matters it dealt
9
with.
Hapgood (1934, pp. 4-5) observed that the first problem in
moving toward workers' control of the business, namely, gaining
the trust of workers and overcoming their distrust of owners, was
an easier one to solve than the second problem of overcoming
workers' lack of confidence in themselves. Whether or not one
accepts Hapgood's view of the relative ease of solving the first
over the second problem, it seems clear that the Committee did
not waste much time -- nor appear to have lacked enough
confidence -- to test both the limits of its decision-making power
and the extent of Hapgood and his family's commitment to
sharing such authority with workers. Early on in its tenure in
1917, the Committee tackled two important issues: the schedule
of working hours and the placement of rank-and-file workers on
salary.
A work week of fifty-five hours during most of the year,
except during the peak packing season from late August through
October when longer hours were required, was the norm at
Columbia. At the end of the second month of its operation, the
Committee sought to change this norm by proposing a reduction
from 55 to 50 hours per week. Perhaps not coincidentally,
members of the Committee first brought this matter up for
discussion during Hapgood's absence, when it was endorsed by
those present. Although William P. recommended upon his
return, and the Committee agreed, that the implementation of the
decision be delayed for a month due to an increase of sales, the
new fifty-hour week was enacted after this short delay. This was
the norm at Columbia until 1921, when Council, after a brief trial
period, reduced it to a forty-four hour work week (an eight-hour
day, five days a week and a half-day on Saturday), excluding,
again, the peak canning period from August through October
10
which required a greater hours. Shortly thereafter, in April of
1922, the working schedule was again changed to a five-day
11
week and nine-hour day during the non-peak period. The latter
was reaffirmed in November 1923 with the added provision that
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workers will be paid for a full ten hour day although they work
12
only nine hours.
It is worth noting that the canning industry was no different
during Columbia's time than it is today, namely, a highly
seasonal industry in which work is concentrated during the
harvest period when products such as tomatoes must be packed
within a very short time. It is certainly one of Columbia's most
remarkable achievements that it was possible for the Committee
in 1917 to discuss and eventually approve a policy of year-round
employment for most employees. This was accomplished
through placing the majority of workers, except for a small group
of surplus temporary wage workers employed only during the
canning season, on annual salary. As Hapgood (1934, p. 21)
observed: "We finally agreed that our first responsibility
thereafter should be regularity of employment... Accordingly we
placed most of the wage force on a salary basis with the
understanding that they would be retained by the year..."
The Committee was replaced in 1918 by a dual governing
structure involving a Council, which assumed the Committee's
former decision-making authority, and a Factory Committee,
which became advisory to Council until 1920, when it was
13
disbanded due to apparent lack of interest. Council
membership was initially restricted to supervisory staff such as
department heads, while the new Factory Committee was an
elected body of "rank-and-file" (i.e., non-supervisory) workers.
Within the space of a few years, however, criteria for
membership on Council was broadened sufficiently to be open to
any regular, full-time employee who was willing and able to
attend its bi-weekly meetings (Hapgood, 1934, p. 15; Douglas,
1922-23 & 1926). In June, 1921, Council decreed that any
salaried employee could become a member by attending eight
consecutive meetings; likewise any Council member who missed
l4
two consecutive meetings without reason could be dropped.
Even this restriction was removed in 1924 so that any employee,
including wage workers, could attend and vote in Council
meetings without prior attendance (except on an issue that the
Council determined could be voted upon only by its senior
members, a situation that occurred only once in 1925).
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A very generous profit-sharing plan by any standard then or
now was introduced at Columbia in 1917-18 in which all profits,
after expenses and taxes, were to be divided equally between
stockholders and employees. For this purpose an annual salary
of $1000 was made the equivalent of $1000 worth of stock and
both the worker and stockholder received the same dividend
based on their $1000 "share." Profit-sharing was limited in 191718 to salaried employers and dividends were often paid in the
form of stock which Columbia would buy back at par value from
employees for cash. The dividend paid to stockholders and
employees alike was 10% in 1917, 12% in 1918, 6% in 1919,
12.5% in 1922, and 10% in 1924. Columbia made no profit in
1920, 1921, and 1923, due to depressed business conditions.
Workers' share of total profits amounted to 10.8% in 1917 and
$11,800 was distributed to employees, workers' share was 8.7%
of all profits in 1918 and $5,900 was allocated, workers' share
was 8.8% of all profits in 1919 and $5,000 was distributed to
workers, workers' share of profits was 14.6% in 1922 and $6,880
was distributed to employees, and workers' share of profits was
17.9% in 1924 and $12,600 was distributed to employees.
Beginning in 1920, at Hapgood's suggestion, two of
Columbia's five-person Board of Directors were to be from the
15
rank-and-file, non-supervisory class of employees. Hapgood
hoped that greater representation of the rank-and-file worker on
the Board would alleviate any lingering concerns or doubts on
the part of the rank-and-file that the interests of the majority of
workers were not being safeguarded. Over time, as the
membership and authority of Council increased, the Board of
Directors became less and less prominent in company affairs to
the point where it became a virtual rubber stamp for the
16
decisions of Council. Council dealt with a wide range of topics,
including manufacturing decisions and marketing strategies, an
employee classification system for salary and a determination of
each employee's salary, including the salaries of Board
members and company officers, as well as the range of benefits
they should receive.
Placing Columbia’s workplace democracy in perspective, a
few facts concerning profit sharing and employee management
in the industrial era of its time speak volumes. As of 1923,
businesses with 250 or less employees represented 96.5% of all
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manufacturing concerns and only 3.8% and 2.5%, respectively,
17
of small plants offered profit-sharing plans and works councils.
In 1920, the National Industrial Conference Board found only 97
18
profit-sharing plans in existence in the country. In 1919, there
were but 18 works councils among industrial establishments
(seven in the food industry) of less than 200 employees, and
19
even fewer -- 12 -- by 1924. And in no case did any of these
works councils actually have managerial authority and
20
responsibility comparable to that of Columbia's Council. As
one contemporary student of Columbia, Paul H. Douglas
(1922/23, p. 6), observed: “Unlike every other shop committee
that I know of, no subject was excluded from their consideration,
for they were empowered to deal with any question that related
to the factory as a whole, whether it had to do with adjusting
‘wages, hours and conditions of labor’ or general factory
problems of management."
The Golden Years: 1925-1930
By the year 1925, Columbia had achieved considerable
success in establishing workplace democracy through its
employee management and profit-sharing plans. Norman
Hapgood, William's brother and also a major stock-holder in the
company, stated at the Annual Meeting of January 18, 1924, that
Council "has really learned its job," in reference to its ability to
successfully manage the company during a period when William
P. Hapgood was ill and unable to work. Columbia had put into
place by 1925 a number of progressive employee benefits and
working conditions. In addition to placing workers on regular, fulltime employment throughout the year and shortening working
hours, workers also received a month-long vacation with pay, full
pay due to sickness and injury, and a fully paid maternity leave
of six weeks for both wage and salary workers -- the latter
representing Columbia's innovative leadership in many areas
21
taken for granted by labor today. Yet even more was to be
accomplished at Columbia in the next few years that would
further solidify its framework of workplace democracy and
significantly add to employee benefits and working conditions.
Perhaps the single most important event during this period
was the offering and acceptance of a contract between
stockholders (primarily the Hapgood family) and salaried
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employers which provided for the eventual ownership of
Columbia by its employees. Professor Douglas (1922/23, p. 32)
of the University of Chicago, who had visited and studied
Columbia in its early years, wrote: "It is conceivable that the
absentee owners of the company may come to disapprove of the
experiment and call a halt upon it." He concluded that it would be
"desirable for the workmen gradually to take up the stock of the
owners and thus come to own as well as to manage the
industry." Accordingly, the Hapgood family began in late 1924 to
discuss with Council a plan whereby employees could acquire
ownership and control of Columbia. Professor Douglas in fact
visited Council in March 1925 to discuss the Hapgood proposal
with employees and, after revision and re-submission of the plan,
a long discussion was held on December 18, 1925, in which
Council voted 57 to 1, with one abstention, to accept it.
The new contract between Columbia's stockholders and its
salaried workers assigned net profits to workers after (1)
22
dividends of 10% were paid on common stock and salaries, (2)
reserves were set aside for taxes and depreciation, and (3) 10%
of the remaining amount was set aside as a pension fund under
control of Council. Net profits were to be used by workers to
purchase common stock at $150 per share until all common
stock had been bought. Not unlike the year 1917, when
workplace democracy began at Columbia, 1925 was a very
profitable year which resulted in some $50,000 becoming
available to salaried employers for the purchase of common
stock. Council decided on January 5, 1926 to establish a trust
fund for workers overseen by three trustees elected by Council
who would have legal title to the common stock acquired by this
contract and the right to vote at the annual stockholders'
meetings "subject to the advice and consent of Council." The
final contract was signed on January 15, 1926, by 93 salaried
workers. Due to profitable years from 1925 through 1930, with
the exception of 1927, workers at Columbia acquired 51% of
common stock in July, 1930, and legal control of the company, a
fact that was widely reported in most major newspapers
throughout the nation, including the New York Times,
Indianapolis Star and Indianapolis Times. Within a few more
years, workers collectively owned 63% of common stock.
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Working conditions; including wages and other employee
benefits, improved substantially during this period. When older
workers were no longer able to work, they were provided with
23
pensions. Group life insurance was also made available to
employees with the company paying 25% of the cost. A health
committee was established in 1926 and successfully
recommended to Council in 1927 that a physician be engaged to
make daily visits to the plant for consulting about employees'
illness and accidents. This program was expanded in 1929 to
include regular examinations for employees and other medical
intervention, including hospital care, at company expense. There
24
were physicians on staff along with a medical advisor,
Columbia also took financial responsibility for the health care of
dependents, at first by establishing a fund which would loan
funds to employees to repay on the basis of ability to do so, and,
25
then, later by underwriting the cost for all dependents. Dental
and eye care for employees, including the cost for one pair of
26
glasses, was included as part of the health beneft. And,
indicative of their new positions as employee-owners, Council
decided in July, 1929, that salaried employees would no longer
be required to punch in on the time-clock.
Education was another central concern to Columbia that was
demonstrated in several ways. It had become customary from
the outset for outside speakers to be invited to speak at Council
meetings on topics of general interest, especially those involving
27
social and labor issues. An arrangement between Antioch
College, Ohio, and Columbia existed in which male and female
students were hired for alternate, rotating six-week internships at
28
the company. Students from such universities and colleges as
Ames Agricultural College, Iowa, Indiana Central University (now
The University of Indianapolis), Butler University, and Earlham
College, Richmond, were employed so that they might learn
about industrial democracy and as a means of potential
29
recruitment of college graduates to Columbia. Columbia
workers were given a chance to further their education through
scholarships for summer school at the University of Wisconsin
30
and other schools.
Perhaps the most compelling evidence of Columbia's
commitment to education is exemplified by its extraordinary
efforts to "start an educational department to deal with the social
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sciences, beginning with economics and the history of the labor
movement." (Hapgood, 1934, p. 38) Council made the decision
to employ an instructor in "the history of economics and social
31
philosophy" in July 1925.
Several months later on November
13, 1925, on the recommendation of William P. Hapgood,
Council made an offer to Jack Evans, a teacher who had
experience instructing miners in Wales. Although initially
32
reluctant to accept the offer, Jack Evans did finally agree to join
33
Columbia in November 1926, assuming at first the roles of
34
librarian and chair of the library committee. Classes were
begun in late February, 1927, and demand was sufficient by
April of that year to require doubling the number of classes to
35
alleviate overcrowding. Another teacher and a graduate of Yale
University, J. Levering Evans, was offered a position at Columbia
36
in April, 1927, due to the apparent demand for classes. This
educational program was short-lived, however, due apparently
to a lack of continuing interest on the part of workers. Hapgood
(1934, p. 39) wrote: “The classes were held outside of working
hours and most of the workers were too tired to apply
themselves to a new undertaking following the regular day's
work. It was difficult, also, for them to understand how the
information they were acquiring in classes would assist them in
business.” The program was revived again in 1930 with 14
classes per week in such areas as Industrial History, Elementary
Economics, and Labor Problems, with a total enrollment of 83
employee-owners. However, this program was once again
abandoned with the advent of the Depression and the company
conflict of 1932-1933.
Personnel issues, especially salary matters, appear to have
dominated much of Council's attention throughout the mid to late
1920s. Prior to 1925 there were three or four categories for
classifying most employees with the exception of supervisory
staff such as foremen and forewomen, department heads, and
other administrative personnel and excluding most salesmen
who were on a commission basis. Women were paid on a
parallel but lower scale. For example, the salary scale for males
and females per week over the seven year period 1917 to 1924
was as follows (minimum, class c, to maximum, class a, rates):
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YEAR
1917
1918
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924

MALES FEMALES
$14 - 17
$17 - 19
$21 - 24
$22 - 26
$22 - 26
$22 - 26
$24 - 27
$24 - 27

$09 - 11
$12 - 14
$13 - 15
$14 - 17
$14 - 17
$14 - 17
$16 - 18
$16 - 18

On January 23, 1925, Council abolished the foregoing
classification system for salaries and appointed a committee to
formulate a new plan. The main reason for dissatisfaction with
the old system was that there were too few categories for
satisfactory placement of all workers. Accordingly, the committee
reported back on New Year's Eve day with a new salary scale of
ten levels beginning with a minimum of $18 for level 1, $24 for
level 5, $30 for level 9, and any amount over $30 determined by
Council for level 10. The scale was gender neutral or the same
for men and women, however, most women at Columbia tended
to occupy positions at the lower end of the scale except for those
few in an office or supervisory capacity. The salary scale as well
as the philosophy underlying it was changed again on March 24,
1926, when it accepted a committee's proposal "to pay married
man in proportion to his financial needs." Council decided to
establish $24 per week as the minimum salary for a married man
(versus $19 minimum for a single male), with the further
stipulation that every man who currently received less than $30
would receive an additional $1 per week for each child under 16
years old, up to three children, and up to a maximum of $30.
Payment over $30 per week was to be based only on merit and
not on the basis of financial need.
The issue of gender equality under this new system of
payment based on need was brought to Council on March 25,
1927, when it considered and voted down several motions
concerning female heads of households being placed at the
same minimum salary of $24 as men were then receiving.
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However, as was the Columbia way, it was decided to defer this
topic to a later meeting after a committee had time to study the
37
matter and make a recommendation to Council. It was agreed
shortly thereafter that the marriage differential and child
allowance would be paid to any woman who was the head of the
household and the chief economic provider for her family,
demonstrating Columbia's commitment to gender equality and
justice. On this score, Columbia displayed a real commitment to
gender equality in the workplace which was many years ahead
38
of general American business practice.
Apparently anxious about the newly revised salary schedule
and those placed within it, Council appointed on May 20, 1927, a
brand new committee, the Salary Key Committee, to examine
the salaries of all employees and to suggest if necessary another
new salary key. The committee reported back to Council in July,
1927 with the new salary key, which included not only familiar
rating criteria such as work efficiency but also less familiar
criteria such as understanding of Columbia' s co-operative goal.
The new salary guidelines were approved and the Salary Key
Committee spent the next half a year determining employees'
salaries on this basis.
Several important policies in relation to salary issues were
decided by Council in December, 1927. These included on
December 3rd and 5th a unanimous reaffirmation of the belief in
a minimum salary (then $19 per week), approval of a $9.50 per
week marriage differential, and approval of a $1 per week
39
increase in the child allowance to $2 per child per week. On
December 9th and 10th, Council decided that single men and
women would begin at the same minimum salary, the marriage
differential and child allowance would be paid to employed
widows and widowers to enable them to care for their children,
the single minimum salary would be raised to $20.50, and that
the marriage differential would be an additional 50% of the single
minimum salary (or $10.25).
As if all this were not enough, salary issues continued to be
discussed in Council throughout 1928 and 1929. Hapgood
(1934, pp. 28-29) summarizes this process and the final
outcome.
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At one time we spent over a year in an attempt to find a
scale by means of which we could more clearly determine
the contribution of the employee to the business, and thus
estimate more exactly what his income should be. Finally a
committee of the most able men and women in the plant was
chosen to give this problem serious study.... In the early part
of 1929, after the committee had reported its complete
inability to find a satisfactory method of payment based on
comparative merits, Council reviewed its whole experience
with the problem and agreed unanimously that payment of
salaries on the basis of need should henceforth be our
method.
To pay wages and salary on the basis of need rather than merit
represented a radical departure from the customary practice
employee compensation. Throughout April and May, 1929,
every employee's rating and salary was reviewed by Council
according to two different sets of criteria: (1) efficiency and (2)
need. Nearly every employee, except for a few technicians,
received higher pay when being rated under the new system for
payment according to needs. Council decided to pay on the
basis of need except for those persons who wished to be paid
strictly on the basis of efficiency because their salary would be
higher this way. In addition a needs committee was charged with
the responsibility of reviewing requests for special needs
(Hapgood, 1934 p. 30). With the adoption of this salary plan
based on need, Columbia clearly departed from the mainstream
views of both big business and organized labor with regard to
employee wages and compensation.
The Depression Years and Early Strains, 1931-1932
The financial impact of the Depression was initially very mild
at Columbia. In 1930, Columbia was by far the leading national
packer of private label soups for over 160 private labels, and
these brands were distributed through 500 jobbers and over 250
distributors nationwide in most states and major cities/towns. Its
business outlook in 1930 was excellent and, in the absence of
clear economic signs of a severe and significant disruption of the
business cycle just around the corner, Columbia entered the
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1930s highly optimistic and quite unprepared for the economic
decline that was to come.
The first indication that the financial situation of the company
was more serious than anyone realized was the financial report
of March 20, 1931, and news of a sharp decline of 30% in sales.
Still, at this point in time, William P. Hapgood believed that the
sales problem was primarily a marketing and distribution one
involving jobbers and, therefore, a problem capable of
remediation with greater sales effort on the part of the company.
It became increasingly apparent, however, throughout the late
spring and summer of 1931 that the general economic situation
was becoming steadily worse and would likely remain so for
some time. Canned soup, after all, had been bought by
consumers for convenience and as a time-saver, and as the
depression widened and deepened and more people lost their
jobs and incomes declined, soup became a luxury that many
could no longer afford.
In April and May, 1931, Council debated whether or not to
release wage workers. After hearing the recommendation of a
committee, and after much emotional debate and soul-searching,
Council reluctantly voted on May 15, 1931 to let wage workers
go. In retrospect, this lay-off would signal the beginning of
difficult financial times at Columbia and would be the first of
many cutbacks that would have to be imposed over the next
months. Two weeks later, on May 29, 1931, Council discussed a
proposal put forward by William P. Hapgood for a 50% salary
reduction for all salaried employers in order to cope with the
growing deficit. In part this suggestion resulted from Columbia's
inability to repay, in view of the seriously depressed economy
and resulting slow sales, a twelve month loan to Fletcher
American National Bank of Indianapolis. Although another loan
was secured from the Central Trust Fund of Chicago at a lower
interest rate to meet the latter obligation, operating expenses
were quickly outpacing slow soup sales and Council agreed on
June 1, 1931, to the temporary salary reduction of 50% of the
1930 salary rate for as long as financial conditions made it
necessary.
All cost cutting measures at Columbia were predicated on
the co-operative principle that salary reduction was preferable to
the discharge of any employee due to economic reasons.
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Although some employees did resign or were fired for cause
during this period, Columbia laid off no salaried employees due
to financial exigency at this or any other point in its history, an
exceptional performance for such a business at the time. By the
beginning of September, 1931, salaries were raised back to 70%
of the 1930 rate; by the beginning of October, 1931, to 80%.
However, due to the worsening economic situation, another
salary reduction in the spring of 1932 of about 20% was
proposed, and on April 22, 1932, Council agreed after much
discussion to reduce salaries to about 60% of their 1930 rate.
There was disagreement about whether health benefits and
other aspects of the "social program," as it was referred to,
should be sacrificed prior to a salary reduction, but a majority of
workers favored retaining the benefits and, instead, reducing
salary for all. As the economic situation continued to deteriorate,
several additional cost-cutting measures were debated and
40
eventually instituted within the next few months. More drastic
measures were voted by Council in May, 1932, including a
further 33% reduction in payroll (every third paycheck was
skipped) due to a lack of operating funds, elimination of free
health care for dependents, and elimination of free meals at the
plant during overtime.
Council had approved the first proposal for a 50% salary
reduction on June 1, 1931 as a deferred payment, that is, with
the assumption that the lost income would eventually be repaid.
However, one year later, Columbia was still paying deferred
salaries, when it was able to pay salaries at all, and in June,
1932, the company bookkeeper, Howard Herner, suggested that
deferred salaries be removed from the company books and an
unofficial list be kept of the income due each worker. Council
passed this recommendation as a motion, but it was informed
shortly thereafter by its CPA that this was an illegal practice and
that Council should have canceled unpaid salaries in full,
Council, therefore, reluctantly agreed on July 1, 1932, to officially
cancel all deferred salaries, but in so doing it was informally
understood that these would be paid back when the company
was financially well.
After the cancellation of deferred salaries from the
company's books, Columbia's operating loss was $70,000 as of
July 15, 1932. With the use of available funds in the surplus
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account, this deficit was reduced to about $40,000. Without the
cancellation of deferred salaries from the books, the company
would have been closer to $110,000 in the red, seriously
impairing its financial independence and perhaps even risking
41
receivership.
Nevertheless, the formal cancellation of deferred
salaries was controversial and, for the first time perhaps at
Columbia, a deep and lingering feeling of distrust and suspicion,
if not outright hostility, appears to have existed on the part of
more than a few workers toward the company and its leaders.
The existence of such a divisive mood is reflected by the fact
that the motion to officially cancel all deferred salaries was
challenged, although unsuccessfully, by some employees just
one week after Council had approved it.
One factor underlying this controversy and moral problem
was the unresolved, structural tension—even contradiction—
implicit in the dual role of worker-owner at Columbia. Workers
were being asked to recognize that, as part-owners, they could
not receive income for wages when the company was operating
at a loss. At the same time, many workers saw themselves as
employees who were entitled to a wage as long as they put in
hours for the company, regardless of its financial situation.
Workers were owners collectively under the trust arrangement,
and majority ownership of the company enabled them to
collectively administer and manage the firm; but individually the
worker did not share directly in the financial aspect of ownership
since he or she had no individual access to the wealth
represented by the common stock as, for example, when or if he
or she left the company. This tenuous, abstract character of
worker ownership would play some role in fostering social unrest
at Columbia in the months ahead.
Personal and Factional Conflict, 1931-1933
A second factor contributing to the morale problem at
Columbia stemmed from major unresolved differences within the
sales department regarding personalities, management styles,
sales strategies, and opinions of how best to respond to the
economic crisis. All of these various differences and tensions
appear to have crystallized around William P. Hapgood' s
introduction and promotion of the Columbia label, which many in
the sales department opposed.
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Partly to offset the declining sales of private label soups,
which were then having difficulty competing with Campbell's,
William P. Hapgood, head of the sales department (as well as
general manager and president), proposed a new marketing
strategy to promote the sale of its soup. Columbia's story of
workplace democracy, which had by this time received a good
deal of local and national publicity, was to serve as the focus of a
42
national advertising campaign. Slogans included lines such as
"made by cooks who care," and "the business without a boss,"
which was taken from an article in the Indianapolis Times of
February 13, 1930, by its editor, Boyd Gurley. This article was
reproduced in pamphlet form and provided to wholesalers and
others for distribution to consumers. Advertisements were placed
in local Indianapolis papers, the Times and Star, and national
media such as the Christian Science Monitor. Even labels on
cans told about the Columbia experiment:
No wonder we make such fine soups, catsup, tomato juice
and other products. We the workers own the business. We
are proud we have succeeded, and succeeded because we
have done better work because we cared. Not one of us has
been discharged on account of hard times. For us there is no
unemployment. There are 52 pay envelopes a year, old age
pensions, expert care in sickness and in health, three weeks
vacation with full pay. Why should we not make good
products? If you think this plan should spread, and if you find
this product is better because it is made by cooks who care,
please tell your friends about it.
As another example, a twelve segment weekly serial,
"Where Labor Recaps Its Full Reward," was run primarily in
labor, co-operative and other newspapers. Articles written about
Columbia by both those inside and outside the company, for
example, "Where Workers Rule," by Powers Hapgood, which
appeared in The Railway Clerk, also helped to publicize
workplace democracy at Columbia around the nation. Finally, a
speakers committee composed mainly of sales staff, including
William P. and his son, Powers, was organized to provide
speakers for church and college groups, labor unions, and
business groups.
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At first William P. 's publicity plan called for placing a
reference to Columbia and its unique workplace democracy on
the labels of private distributors for which Columbia packed.
However, due to the reluctance of some private labels (including
those in Indianapolis) to go along with this idea, Hapgood
advocated selling soup directly under a brand new Columbia
Conserve Company label. Such a step which would place it more
or less directly in competition with Campbell's Soups. Hapgood
was encouraged in this plan by a combination of (1) small but
significant pockets of local markets throughout the United States
where Campbell's soups had not penetrated and (2) strong
grass-roots support among socially concerned and Churchbased groups in New England (New Haven), the Midwest (for
example, Michigan), the West coast, and elsewhere. Such
groups of consumers were very attracted to the story of
Columbia' s commitment to workplace democracy and appeared
43
to be willing to help the company promote its soup.
Canning for private labels had pretty much enabled
Columbia up to this time to avoid high advertising costs, but the
private label business was now clearly distressed and its future
outlook uncertain. Hapgood' s new marketing program was
designed to produce badly needed sales of Columbia soup, but it
did have some risks. It was unclear whether the Columbia label
could stimulate sufficient soup sales and, during a period of
financial hardship and cutbacks for workers, it would be using
scarce resources. Advertising costs had been very modest up to
the late 1920s, while publicity and advertising costs for 1931
alone exceeded $40,000. This was roughly the same amount of
deferred salaries which Council, as we have seen, officially
canceled in July 1932. Some of the sales staff also argued that
the Columbia label took business away from its own private label
business which, if true, would be self-defeating.
Yet, at the same time, doing nothing was likewise not without
risks of its own. The bottom line was that the company could not
survive very long without increased soup sales. Could the new
sales program succeed and, if so, could it succeed before the
company went bankrupt? Or would it merely hasten bankruptcy?
And, perhaps most importantly of all, could the controversy and
differences of opinion relating to this and related matters be
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satisfactorily resolved within the framework of workplace
democracy at Columbia?
Disagreement and contention within the sales department
over the Columbia label resulted, at the end of 1931, in the
division of the sales department into two departments, one
dealing primarily with the new Columbia label business in New
England, the Midwest, the West, and the Chicago area, and the
44
other with the remaining private label business. This
arrangement lasted only a few months, however, since it had
become apparent that the structure was inefficient and all sales
staff, with their consent, were again placed under the direction of
Hapgood.
The business picture presented at the Annual Meeting of
July 15, 1932, was grim and provided little basis for future
optimism. Sales were down about one-third over the previous
year, and there was a net operating loss for the year of $70,000.
The bad news precipitated a tense atmosphere involving various
charges concerning who and what was to blame for the current
financial crisis. The Columbia label and Hapgood' s autocratic
style of management was cited by some as the leading cause,
while others pointed to the factionalism introduced at the plant by
the newer "college group" that was trying to impose "socialism"
on the others. Still others cited deferred salaries as the reason.
In spite of the foregoing expression of discontent by some, the
same persons who had served the previous year were re-elected
to the Board of Directors shortly later that evening at the
45
stockholder's meeting.
Relations between Hapgood and many in the sales
department continued to deteriorate throughout the next several
months, as evidenced by the confrontational and personal nature
of the final Council meeting of the year. At the December, 29,
1932, meeting, Hapgood was attacked and rebuked by several
members of his sales staff. John Brophy, a former trade unionist
and relative newcomer, criticized Hapgood for his autocratic style
of management. He also criticized Hapgood for certain aspects
of the Columbia label project, especially the emphasis on the
social program at Columbia to market soup. He suggested that
"the foundation on which the publicity was based was based has
been gradually destroyed... (and that) many of the elements
which made the story valuable do not now exist." While
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admitting that selling soup under the Columbia label was a
correct decision, since it was selling quite well, many of the sales
staff felt that too much money was being spent on an
"advertising orgy." They also believed that the marketing
program should emphasize price and quality over Columbia's
workplace democracy, which they claimed was no longer in
existence due partly to Hapgood's autocracy. Hapgood
defended the decision to sell soup under the Columbia label. He
pointed out that the publicity campaign, involving public speaking
and advertising in selected papers, was actually very modest in
cost, considering the results. Hapgood defended the promotion
of Columbia label soup with an emphasis on the company's
workplace democracy and resulting social programs. Finally, he
suggested that for the staff to try to tell the manager or other
"technician" (professional) how to lead a department was taking
46
democracy to an "absurdity and ruin."
An attempt was made at the first Council meeting of the new
year, January 4, 1933, to restore at least some of the civility
which had recently been lost by adopting a more formal
requirement that persons stand when addressing the group.
However, the rupture in social relations and community was far
deeper than could be restored by such simple measures. This
was clearly evident in a speech given by John Brophy directed
against William P., in which he stated that 95 per cent of
Columbia label sales would have been gained anyway without
the assistance of the publicity program. He further accused
William P. Hapgood of having an "obsession with show and
front," and he suggested that all of the emphasis on publicity was
"a form of self-intoxication" for Hapgood. Following Brophy' s
speech, another salesman, Frank Eustis, made the motion that
no money be spent on publicity for the first six months of the
year. Hapgood responded by explaining that they were in the
middle of a promotional campaign in Michigan that relied upon
public speaking and other publicity to sell soup, and that he had
already made commitments to people which he felt obligated to
honor. Eustis further stated that some of the speakers who were
promoting soup were misrepresenting the program by the
omission of important facts. He then digressed to a criticism of
stockholders' contracts, dividends' problems, the relation
between Columbia and the Hapgood Farm, and the bookkeeping
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that was being done for the Hapgoods by the company. After
much acrimonious debate and discussion, Eustis' s motion was
47
passed by Council.
Two days later, on January 6, 1933, another Council
meeting was held in which Hapgood stated that he would resign
within two weeks if he was not allowed full authority to run his
department. Brophy immediately challenged Hapgood's demand
as "undemocratic" and he claimed that Hapgood was asking for
a "dictatorship." At this point William P. Hapgood withdrew from
the meeting, leaving behind his brother, Norman, to represent his
point of view. After some discussion, in which some of the sales
staff argued in favor of accepting Hapgood' s resignation, the
motion was made by Dan Donovan, an ally of Brophy' s (and
brother-in-law to William’s son, Powers Hapgood) and member
of the sales department, not to accept Hapgood' s resignation.
Although Donovan's motion was passed unanimously, the
major issue appeared unresolved, according to Norman
Hapgood. Before William P. was invited back to the meeting,
Norman gave a long speech in which "he made an effort to
explain the meaning of the vote" regarding publicity on the
previous Wednesday. He contrasted the goals and purposes of
the "old guard or the builders" of the company with the "new
group" of "hot-air artists whose platform is to fight, organize and
speak." Norman declared that a choice must be made between
William P. and "a small group of socialists and trade unionists."
He further suggested that Council consider releasing two people
in order to remove the major obstacle to harmony and to "make it
possible (for the business) to go on." Norman put this in the form
of a motion and asked that Council vote for "either Hapgood or
Brophy-Tearney." Norman's motion was attacked by several
members of the sales group. Out of a sense of solidarity with the
two leaders, nine more individuals voluntarily added their names
to the list along with Brophy and Tearney. However, before the
motion was called for a vote, Norman left the meeting and
returned with his brother. Speaking upon his return to the
meeting, William P. offered to remain in his position as sales
manager if Council would set aside its motion from two days
earlier regarding publicity funds, which Council agreed to do.
Hapgood also demanded that "trade-union political tactics" being
used by some in the plant be stopped, as well as the personal,

Journal for the Liberal Arts and Sciences 17(1)

95

Fall 2012

ad hominem, attacks on him by Brophy. Brophy responded by
accusing Hapgood of harboring a "Messianic complex," and of
failing in practice to live up the ideals of democracy about which
48
he had been preaching for so many years.
What had begun ostensibly as a disagreement over
advertising policy had escalated into a showdown between two
factions for control of the company. On the one hand, there were
the trade unionists and others within the sales department led by
Brophy. On the other, there were the administrative staff and
department heads, officers, and other long-time members of the
organization, including William H. Hapgood. Obviously, such
social and political conflict could not have come at a less
opportune time for Columbia, given the on-going economic crisis
which gave no sign of relief. Indeed, the financial report
presented to Council on January 20, 1933, showed there had
been a loss of $62, 000 over the previous six months and a loss
of $12, 000 over the most recent two months alone. It was noted
that the company probably had fifty more employees on the
payroll than it could afford. Clearly, by adding more problems to
its already pressing financial agenda, Columbia risked
disintegration, bankruptcy, and receivership. No doubt the
seriousness of the economic situation weighed heavily on the
minds of the Hapgood faction as it considered its options for
what, in its view, amounted to saving the business from certain
ruin.
The Council meeting of Monday, January 30, 1933, lasting
from 6:00 P.M. to 9:45 P.M., was without doubt the most
controversial, ferocious and bitter assembly of workers ever held
at Columbia. A few days earlier, Frank Eustis had decried the
fact that too much power was concentrated in the hands of
William P. Hapgood and a few others in the company, a situation
that he claimed undermined "real industrial democracy" at
Columbia. Accordingly, Eustis had made an unprecedented
proposal to invest a substantial sum of money in the company if
there was a re-election of all leaders within the plant under the
authority of Council (virtually all managerial and administrative
staff with the exception of the Board of Directors). No decision
had been made on this proposal at the time it was presented,
although there had been much heated discussion. It was the
major item of business on January 30th when, after further
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acrimonious debate and a call for a secret ballot, a motion to
reject Eustis's proposal was defeated 57 to 43.
Just before the vote on Eustis's motion, William P. Hapgood
revealed to Council that there had been efforts to arrive at a
compromise prior to the meeting. These efforts involved his son,
Powers Hapgood, who had close ties to members of the trade
union faction and who had been recently recuperating at home
49
due to an accident. They also involved Brophy, Donovan and
Tearney of the sales group. Hapgood's plan involved withdrawal
of Eustis's motion and a sixty day truce. Hapgood observed with
respect to his compromise plan that an "olive branch has been
extended and it had been rejected" by the Brophy faction.
William P. reported, further, that the Board of Directors had
recently learned that it had the legal authority and obligation to
direct the business. Specifically, he noted that the Directors
could, individually, be held "criminally liable" for acts or
omissions which led to destruction of the business. Accordingly,
while the ballots on the Eustis motion were still being counted,
William P. informed Council that the Board of Directors had met
prior to the current meeting and, by a vote of 4 to 1, had
empowered him, as President, to discharge Brophy, Donovan
and Tearney immediately. This revelation stunned many of those
present, since Council had assumed in theory and practice for
years that it, not the Board, was in charge of such matters. After
bitter personal remarks and heated exchanges between various
persons, a motion was made to disapprove of the Board's action.
It passed by a vote of 44 to 20, with 17 abstentions.
Perhaps in part because of the Council's vote of disapproval of
the Board's action, and perhaps in part because many still hoped
for a more just resolution of issues "without bloodshed," efforts
were made over the next few days to arrive at a more desirable
way out of the present situation. A pivotal role in this regard
appears to have been played by Powers Hapgood, who had
strong personal, family and ideological ties to both parties in the
50
conflict. The conflict between his father and wife’s relatives
and his friends was literally tearing Powers apart emotionally.
Powers appeared at the Council Meeting of February 3,
1933, to share his perspective on recent events. He identified
two main issues which needed to be addressed: (1) should a
worker be discharged for merely stating his or her opinion in
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Council? and, (2) has the Board acted properly by its assertion of
authority over Council? To both of these questions, he replied in
the negative, siding essentially with the Brophy-Donovan faction.
At the same time, Powers defended the good intentions of
William P. with respect to his commitment to democracy. Powers
explained that he viewed the differences between his father and
others on industrial democracy as rooted in an honest
disagreement over where legislative and executive functions
begin and end. He refuted the suggestion of duplicity against
William P. and Norman Hapgood made by Frank Eustis' s
question regarding the ownership of stock held by the brothers'
wives by observing that "it happened to be true but other such
statements had not always been true and no attempt had been
made to give the right impression," noting that "it looked like it
was simply an attempt to prove that the Hapgood brothers could
not be trusted."
Powers offered two possible proposals for discussion. He
suggested first the plan he favored, namely, an internal
committee of five including two members from each faction and
one impartial person. The committee would discuss the issues
and report back to Council in two weeks. He also offered a
second plan suggested by William P., namely, a committee
composed of outsiders that would likewise study Columbia and
offer recommendations on various issues. The outside
committee might include Sherwood Eddy, Jerome Davis, Paul
Douglas, and James Myers, individuals who were somewhat
acquainted with the Columbia experiment and well regarded by
51
both factions. The latter proposal was eventually endorsed by
Council after discussion.
It is an open question whether Power's appearance before
Council and its adoption of this plan was, as Powers had hoped
52
it would be, a healing rather than a widening of the breach. As
Brophy acknowledged, there had been much discussion on
several issues and "the breach had been cut deep and wide."
Nevertheless, a formal agreement between both factions and the
Committee of Four was reached on February 26, 1933, and it
was formally approved by Council the next day. The agreement
was to run until April 1, 1934, and the Committee would make a
number of recommendations on a number of issues of concern
by November 1, 1933. During the interim, temporary limits were
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placed on the authority and responsibilities of both the Board and
the Council. Brophy, Donovan and Tearney were reinstated on
condition that they agree to working for the common good and
avoiding politics while at work. Future discharges by the Board
53
were to be avoided except for cases of gross insubordination.
Unfortunately, the agreement with the Committee of Four
appears in retrospect to have been too little, too late, to bring
about any meaningful cessation of political strife among the
principals at Columbia. As events would show, the breach was,
indeed, too deep and wide to be repaired. Within just a few
weeks of signing the agreement, on March 13th, John Brophy
and Ethlyn Christensen wrote a joint letter to the Committee
54
objecting to the limits placed on Council meetings. Powers
Hapgood, perhaps sensing the futility of his attempt to secure a
compromise between the factions, offered his letter of
resignation to Council on March 17, 1933, stating that he no
longer believed he could "be either happy or useful" at Columbia.
Frank Eustis, meanwhile, had been engaged in an active
campaign against both the Board and William P. Hapgood. This
campaign included meetings with Columbia's major creditor and
other activities seemingly contrary to the spirit, certainly, if not
the letter of the February 26th agreement, which he had signed.
In response William P. wrote a letter of April 3, 1933, to Jerome
Davis about Frank Eustis's conduct requesting the Committee of
Four to allow for the release of employees for reasons other than
insubordination. The authority to terminate employees for
inefficiency, subject to review by an independent mediator, was
granted by the Committee of Four to the Board in a letter to
55
William P. of April 11, 1933. William P. requested Eustis's
56
resignation in a letter of April 12, 1933. Ethlyn Christensen and
two others, including the Council chairman, protesting the
inclusion of inefficiency as a basis for termination and lamenting
the loss of democracy at Columbia under Hapgood's autocracy,
tendered their resignations to Council on April 14, 1933.
Finally, in a letter of April 4, 1933, William P. wrote Jerome
Davis with another request from the Board to be released
entirely from the February 26th agreement with the Committee
since "there is very little possibility of the two groups into which
we have become divided finding a solution of these troubles by
57
discussion and compromise.
William P. once again advocated
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this position on Monday, May 8th, when he informed Council that
it was high time for the worker-owners to decide between either
himself or the Brophy and Donovan faction. The ostensible
reason for Hapgood's demand was a hearing on the previous
Saturday involving a hearing by the impartial arbitrator regarding
the case of Frank Eustis who, refusing to resign, had been
terminated by the Board. According to Hapgood, the
administrative staff who had sat through the meeting had
reported to him that they could not and would not go through
such a "strain" again. The three men were asked to leave the
meeting so that others could freely discuss the situation in their
absence, but Brophy and Donovan left only after, upon their
insistence, a vote was held on the will of the majority regarding
58
their attendance. After a long discussion in which procedural
as well as substantive issues were discussed, three motions
were made and voted upon: First, the motion to accept Hapgood'
s resignation was defeated unanimously; second, a motion to
discharge Brophy was passed by a vote of 48 in favor with 14
opposed and 9 not voting; third, a similar motion to terminate
Donovan was passed by a vote of 47 in favor with 13 opposed
and 7 not voting.
William P. clearly had the overwhelming support of workers
and why not? He and his family had demonstrated by word,
deed and a sharing with workers of their business investment in
Columbia their deep commitment to workplace democracy. The
matter with Brophy and Donovan was not yet over, however. A
Special Council Meeting was held on May 15, 1933, to consider
a letter from the Committee of Four which disputed Council's
authority under the agreement of February 26th to discharge an
employee without review. Apparently Brophy and Donovan, who
had long experience in rough and tumble workplace politics, had
contacted the Committee of Four with their complaint. The letter
to Council stated that either Brophy and Donovan were not
terminated at all or, if so, they were entitled to an impartial review
of their cases.
A motion was made in Council to cancel the agreement and
to ask for the withdrawal of the committee. The rationale for this
motion was the right to self-determination by workers-owners:
the maker of the motion stated that members of the committee
were unable to help those at Columbia solve their problems
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because, on the one hand, they were both too distant and too
unfamiliar with the details of their situation and, on the other,
they simply did not have the responsibility to run the business
which must accompany decision-making. It passed 58 to 1, with
3 abstentions. The Committee of Four, when informed by
Council of its action by telegram, must have been surprised.
They responded by stating that Columbia workers-owners
needed their protection. The Committee also protested that
Council's decision was illegal. After the passage of several
months and further correspondence between Columbia and the
Committee of Four, the Committee made good on its threat to
lodge a "strong public protest and full report," an action which
brought adverse publicity to Columbia. Public airing of the
matter by the publication of the Committee of Four's report in
several periodicals, which had previously been positive and
supportive of the Columbia experiment in workplace democracy,
created a public relations disaster for the company in the months
59
following cessation of conflict. As a result, Columbia lost
whatever moral and competitive edge it may have had in the
marketplace over its competition with respect to its claim to
social justice in the workplace. In this respect it seems clear that
the Committee of Four itself became too involved personally and
failed to accept the fact that an overwhelming majority of workers
had in a democratic fashion voted in favor of William P. versus
the Donovan-Brophy faction. In retrospect, it appears that the
Committee of Four lost sight of the forest due to its focus on a
tree or two and not only failed to support workplace democracy
when it should have done so but then out of spite did all it could
to harm the company and workers who remained.
Declining Years: 1934-1943
The combination of economic depression and internal
conflict had taken a considerable toll on the material and mental
resources of the company. With respect to the financial condition
of the company, Columbia had sales of $626,191 but a loss of
$87,754 during the fiscal year ending June, 30, 1933. A very
modest profit was made for several years afterwards, reaching a
high of $46,648 in the fiscal year ending June 30, 1937.
However, losses again occurred over the next several years until
a profit of about $56,000 was earned in 1942. This was
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immediately followed by a loss of a little under $20,000 in 1943.
As Hapgood noted in a letter of November 27, 1939, to Mr.
Treadwell Cleveland of Allerton, Massachusetts, sales continued
to be the major business problem for Columbia during this
period, as it had been earlier:

The outstanding material problem is sales. I think I did fairly
effective work up to 1931 but since that time I have not been
able to accomplish the sales results which are necessary if
we are to return to the rate of earnings we secured prior to
1931. I know our chief problem but not how to solve it. It is to
show our customers how to put up a successful battle
against both Campbell and Heinz and particularly Campbell.
That problem is what I call sales promotion. The national
advertisers accomplish it by large scale and skillful
advertising. That method is closed to us on account of the
multiplicity of labels under which we pack our products.
Workers-owners at Columbia continued throughout this
period to be paid a portion of the 1930 base rates of $22 per
week for a single person, $33 per week for a married man/head
of household, with $2 additional for each child up to a maximum
of three children, as follows:
Fiscal year ending June 30,
1932 67.8%
1933 33%
1934 54.8%
1935 66.8%
1936 68.8%
1937 72%
1938 80%
1939 73.4%
1940 60%
On an annual basis in 1937-38, a single person earned $1094, a
61
married man with one child $1638, at Columbia. This salary
figure does not include the value of additional benefits such as
health care, lunches, and life insurance contributions, which
amounted to an extra $3.50 minimum per employee per week. In
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comparison, the Morgan Packing Company at Austin, Indiana,
would have paid their employees about $650 per year, and the
Stokely Brothers plant in Indianapolis a little more than Morgan,
had such workers been employed the whole year, which typically
62
was not the case in the highly seasonal canning industry.
Understandably, in light of the earlier conflict, workersowners appeared somewhat reluctant after May, 1933, to
become involved in Council meetings and activities. Still, an
exasperated William P. Hapgood called a special meeting of
owner-employees at the end of 1933 in which he admonished
them about their apparent lack of responsibility with respect to
running the business. He advocated a return to the frequency
and the responsibility of Council meetings and activities of the
past, Those present agreed to do so, by a vote of 42 in favor,
none opposed, and 7 abstentions, with the explicit understanding
that Council action and decision-making would be subject to the
Board of Directors.
An overview of Columbia's social program was presented for
discussion purposes at a Council meeting of January 21, 1935,
in which policies such as guaranteed employment, payment
based on needs, health care, pensions, and life insurance were
summarized and reviewed. At two Council meetings on March 6
and 8, 1935, several guest representatives from the Menominee
Indian Tribe of Wisconsin spoke at length to Council about their
own form of communal government and land ownership, As a
result of these and other discussions held on these matters held
over many months, Council made various changes in Columbia's
social program. Tuition reimbursement for education was
broadened to include instructional classes or courses of even
indirect benefit to the company. Dependents were included once
again in the free health care plan. Pensions were changed from
being based on individual need to 50 per cent of the individual's
salary at retirement. A voluntary group life insurance plan, for
which the company paid 50 per cent of the cost, became
obligatory with a rule that required every person to purchase at
least $1000 of life insurance at a cost of $8.50 to the employee.
And during early 1935, the prevailing need-based method of
salary and wage compensation at Columbia was thoroughly
reviewed and discussed. The Special Income Adjustment
Committee was established to recommend salary adjustments
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based on the responsibility of the position. However, after much
discussion on the committee' s recommendations, no changes in
the salary system were made.
Perhaps the most interesting and notable of Council's
activities during this period was union interest and activity.
William P. had reported at a Council meeting of June 1, 1937,
that he had received a request for food donations from a C.I.O.
leader who was leading a strike against the Morgan Canning
Company of Austin, Indiana. Hapgood offered his view that
Columbia should unionize, leading to a candid discussion of
union issues and an invitation to a field representative of the
newly formed C.I.0. Canners' Union to speak at a future Council
meeting. Some voiced support for a union if it did not mean
jeopardizing the social program, while others recalled the trouble
with trade unionists a few years earlier. Partly at John Brophy's
suggestion, Donald Henderson, President of the Canning Union,
sent an invitation to through the Indiana C.I.O. organizer for
Columbia to send representatives to a convention in Denver for
the unionization of the canning industry. William P. Hapgood
attended the convention on July 9, 1937, along with one other
63
Columbia salaried employee and two wage workers. The
resulting report to Council was generally favorable, though it was
not until April, 1938, shortly after Donald Henderson personally
visited Columbia, that the company elected to establish a C.I.O.
affiliate local of the United Cannery, Agriculture, Packing and
Allied Workers of America. By April 18, 1938, 59 out of the 68
salaried employees had joined the union and on January 13,
1939, Council voted to make union membership made
mandatory, making Columbia a closed shop. However, this
requirement was abolished about a year later and, by late
summer, 1940, the union came to an end due to a lack of
interest on the part of workers.
Given the operating losses sustained by Columbia during
much of this period, the company had been unable to pay any
dividends on common or preferred stock since 1931. As a result,
capital impairment to Columbia in June, 1940, was in the amount
of $201,000 due to accumulated unpaid dividends and debts
owed to the major creditor, the Continental Can Company. Since
there was a total of $211,000 of common stock on the books, the
value of the common stock at this time was essentially nil.
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Accordingly, the Board arrived at a two-step plan in early 1940 to
eliminate this financial impairment through a legal reorganization
of the company. First, in order to facilitate reorganization
proceedings in court, cancellation of the 1926 agreement
between the Hapgoods and employees regarding the purchase
of common stock was agreed to at a Council Meeting of April 19,
1940. It was explained that since employees already owned 63
per cent of common stock, they were the voting majority and
they stood to gain nothing by the purchase of remaining stock.
Second, a proposal was announced at the Annual Meeting of
July 19, 1940 to reduce the amount of common stock issued by
95 per cent (the amount it was impaired) and to distribute the
remaining 5 per cent on a pro rata basis. Although this stock
reduction plan was accepted by those stockholders present by a
vote of 47 to 0, it was later blocked by one stockholder and
former employee, Frank Eustis. As a result of this one person's
refusal, Columbia was unable to reorganize and eliminate its
capital impairment until May 1944.
By mid-1942, Council meetings had become so rare that the
question was asked at a Council meeting of July 24th whether it
was even necessary to elect officers for the new year. At the
July, 1942, Annual Meeting of Stockholders considerable
dissatisfaction with current salary levels, in view of the rising cost
of living, was expressed by several workers-owners. Hapgood
responded by pointing out that it was not advisable to raise
salaries in light of the large deficit, even though the company had
posted its first profit ($56,000) in five years, since the future
outlook was still uncertain. No action was taken by the Board or
Council to raise salaries. The salary issue was apparently
important to many workers-owners, insofar as the Board's
apparent unwillingness to grant a raise appears to have served
as the catalyst for the formation of an A.F.L. local at Columbia in
the late summer of 1942. The new union's major demand,
presented on August 14, 1942, was a raise for all workers. At the
time, Columbia was paying $17 per week for a single woman,
$23.50 for a single man, and $24.50 for a head of household
with one child. The union was demanding a minimum of $22 per
week for women and $30 per week for men. The Board agreed
to raise wages for hourly workers from between 2.5 to 7.5 cents
an hour, depending on classification. It was willing to allow any
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salaried employee to switch to an hourly status and receive
hourly wages. But it steadfastly refused to grant any monetary
increase to salaried employees so long as they remained on
salary (and enjoyed such benefits as permanent employment).
Hapgood expressed his consternation at the workers-owners’
demands: “ I have been disappointed that very few of our salary
workers have understood their responsibility in a partnership.
That they have not taken this responsibility is clear, and that they
will not take it is just as clear, because of the proposal they
64
make...”
At a Board meeting of August 24, 1942, attended by a
Conciliator from the U.S. Department of Labor, the decision was
made that the trust fund holding the collective stock of the
workers-owners should be dissolved and the common stock
distributed to individual employees. Accordingly, at the last
recorded meeting of Council held on August 24, 1942, the
position of the Board was reported and a motion to dissolve the
trust was put on the floor for a vote, It was explained that the
Board had met all of the union's demands with the exception of
increasing the salaries of salaried employees. Hugh Gormley,
the Indianapolis representative of the A.F.L., attended the
meeting and endorsed the Board's proposal. During the
discussion some workers-owners expressed concern about
whether workers would still exercise control over the company
subsequent to the dissolution of the trust. As Hapgood
explained, they could in fact still maintain such control if they
cooperated in voting their individual stock for Board members of
their choice. Nevertheless, the motion was defeated by a two-toone vote of 14 for and 28 against.
Although talks were scheduled between Columbia and union
representatives on September 3rd, a strike occurred before that
time on September 1, 1942, when all but 24 of 241 workers
walked off the job. Both sides agreed to turn the case over to the
National War Labor Board for arbitration, and the job action
officially ended on September 6, 1942. The case was finally
65
resolved on May 5, 1943, in a decision favorable to the Board.
As a result, it was agreed that all production employees, with the
exception of those with supervisory responsibilities, had to join
the union within ten days of employment with the company.
Workers were to be paid on the wage scale the Board had
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proposed prior to the strike, a maximum of $.625 for men and
$.525 for women after 40 days of employment, and they would
receive time-and-a-half for work over 40 hours.
Several months after the strike had occurred, on December
30, 1942, a majority of the remaining salaried employees filed
suit for receivership, alleging gross mismanagement and several
other charges against the Board and the Officers of Columbia. A
trial was held several weeks later in January, 1943, in Marion
County Superior Court, the outcome of which was that the judge
denied the petition of the plaintiffs for a receiver. On February
15, 1943, the Trustees, who held the common stock that
workers-owners purchased collectively under the agreement of
1926, filed a counter-suit to dissolve the trust. A hearing was
held in May, 1943, and Judge Hezzie B. Pike handed down his
decision, favorable to the company and the Trustees, on July 3,
1943. The judge re-affirmed his earlier finding that the company
had not been mismanaged. Specifically, he determined that the
business was not liable to present or former employees for any
claim of back pay or deferred salary. The judge further found that
the "said trust was terminated as of December 31, 1942." As a
result, he decreed that "there is no right now available to any
common stockholder to convert common stock... to preferred
stock." He also noted that the pension plan which was part of the
1926 agreement had been "discontinued and abandoned by the
consent of those interested" and that the company had no
liability for it. Judge Pike also defined a procedure by which the
1,315 shares of common stock held collectively in trust would be
distributed to individual employees by December 31, 1943. It
was based on the number of months the employee worked
between January 21, 1925 and December 31, 1942, as a portion
of the total sum of such months worked by all salaried
employees during this time period.
With the conclusion of the suit and the dissolution of the
trust, the longest chapter of workplace democracy attempted by
a business anywhere came to an abrupt, somewhat inglorious
end. Columbia henceforth operated as any other capitalist
enterprise did. As reported in Business Week (July 31, 1943),
the legal resolution of the case represented the end of a dream
of workplace democracy. Columbia' s financial situation
improved a good deal after the end of World War Two. The
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company largely became a profitable concern following the war
years and it continued in the business of making soup, if not the
production of justice, until it was sold in 1953 to John Sexton and
Company for a sum of about $500,000. All in all, a total of
$178,161 was paid to preferred stockholders, and $489,012 to
common stockholders, upon conclusion of that sale.
Conclusion
In contrast to some writers (Vance, 1956) of the Columbia
experience who have labeled it an "unsuccessful experiment in
industrial democracy," I am more inclined to regard the
Columbia experience along the same lines as does McQuaid
(1976, pp. 510-511), namely, as "one of the most-successful
attempts yet made to create a viable version of that cooperative
industrial commonwealth which had inspired labor leaders,
churchmen, and reformers of the late nineteenth and early
66
twentieth century. In this respect, I believe the Columbia
experience provides the student of industrial organization in
general, and of workplace democracy in particular, with a most
remarkable and unique opportunity to understand the challenges
and constraints that must be faced by any person or group that
would seek to actualize justice in the workplace.
What lessons are to be drawn from this interesting
experiment in workplace democracy? I would like to respond to
this question with a focus on two areas of interest: (1) Council
structure and operation, and (2) the 1926 contract involving the
new profit-sharing plan to acquire collective ownership by
workers-owners of the company.
One major limitation of workplace democracy at Columbia
had to do with the organization of Council, which reflected the
strengths and weaknesses of the "town hall" approach to
democracy with its direct representation by, and participation of,
each individual member of the community on every single issue
or matter that comes before it. Given Columbia's preference for
such direct and total democracy, there was a tendency to create
a system that was inclusive rather than exclusive of communal
members, that is, one that enabled or maximized the
participation by members of the community at Council meetings.
Council operated, for the most part, on the basis of custom with
few formal rules and with no written constitution or by-laws.
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There were few requirements for membership to Council, and
there were virtually no limits -- until 1933, when Council was
reigned in by the Board of Directors -- on the authority and
responsibilities of Council itself. There is no question that the
combination of informality and absolute power of Council at
times encouraged discussion and the expression of viewpoints
among workers, as well as resulted in much innovation and
experimentation, but it also tended to result in much micromanagement and the failure to distinguish between operational
and policy issues -- or what Powers Hapgood in 1933 referred to
as the difference between executive and legislative power.
If Council had had a more clearly defined limit to its authority
-- for example, Council had the authority to determine broad
policies but not to directly supervise day-to-day operations, or to
appoint department heads, but not the authority to attempt to
manage such departments -- then the sales staff could not have
tried in 1932-1933 to politicize their differences with their
department head, William P., over publicity and advertising
policy in Council, as they in fact did. In effect, the sales group
was able to prevail upon Council to attempt to micro-manage the
sales department as the sales staff saw fit on the issue of
publicity. Such decisions ought to have been left to department
heads or the professionals or “technicians” with the knowledge
and expertise to effectively get the job done. Hapgood had
undoubtedly been right on the issue of promoting the Columbia
label, over the resistance of his staff, and he may well have been
right on the need for even more marketing and “publicity” for it.
As department head, he ought to have been relied upon to make
such a call, at least until proven wrong, and not second-guessed
by a Council which lacked the technical expertise to do so. Only
if Council lost confidence with a department's leadership as a
whole, should it act, and then its action should have been limited
to appointing a new leader. As it was, Council had no such
limitations to its authority.
And the responsibility for this latter structural and operational
error in fact and perception resides with the failure of the owners,
including William P., to have fully recognized the legal and
practical problems associated with such total empowerment of
Council. In the end, Columbia operated within the legal
framework of incorporation that dictated the Board of Directors
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was the final authority for all business decisions of the company.
It is difficult to know with any certainty, but what if Council had
been structured at the outset with a more realistic and limited
sense of its scope and authority as enshrined in a set of by-laws,
for example? William P.’s missionary-like zeal for direct, total
democracy would not be tempered until many years later when it
much too late to reconsider.
Nor was enough consideration given in establishing direct
democracy at Columbia to the classic problem of demagoguery
excess faced by all democracies, but especially direct
democracies, beginning with ancient Athens. Emotional appeals
and rhetorical excesses which cloud or circumvent reason are an
inevitable part of the freedom of speech of democracy, but some
consideration or safeguard needs to be given to prevent action
or decision-making from being made in the "heat of passion."
While such a concern may not have been present in the early
days at Columbia when the goal was simply encouraging selfexpression in Council meetings, it potentially became more of a
problem as more self-confident and eloquent speakers joined
Columbia. Without a way to limit debate and rhetorical excess,
Council became an open battleground for war between the two
factions in 1932-33. It did not help that the assembly immediately
voted on proposals without some time for reflection on decisions.
Secondly, it seems clear that there was a fundamental flaw
in the approach to worker ownership of Columbia envisioned in
the 1926 contract. The basic problem is that the procedure was
both an abstraction and a fiction: the purchase of common stock
by workers, held in the collective trust, was essentially a gift from
the Hapgood family who were the original capital owners (and
there was no doubt resentment some felt about the owners' s
generosity) since it was only through their willingness to share
profits in this way that made the purchase of a majority of
common stock possible. Since the worker never "owned" or
possessed the profit to begin with, it was no decision or sacrifice
on the part of the worker to use such funds to buy company
stock. Insofar as the transaction was more or less an abstract
fiction to account for the transfer of ownership from owners to
workers, it did not represent a meaningful commitment on the
part of the individual worker to assume the duty and
responsibilities of ownership -- a criticism frequently leveled at
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workers by William P. Hapgood. As result, concern over wages
paid more honestly and directly reflected the Columbia worker's
interest than owner's concerns.
It is worth noting that Columbia workers were still earning
well above the national average wage of $12.50 in the canning
industry in the early 1930s, even with reduced and occasional
skipped paychecks (as they were a decade later in 1942 when
67
they went out on strike). In addition, no workers at Columbia
were ever threatened with layoff due to the economic situation,
while unemployment in the canning industry was at an all-time
high of over 11 %. And Columbia workers continued to enjoy
various health and other benefits that most workers elsewhere
could only dream of. Objectively, in terms of absolute
deprivation, workers at Columbia were doing quite well even in
the midst of a depression and later recessions; yet, in terms of
relative deprivation and self-perception, workers at Columbia
appeared to underestimate their good fortune and situation.
Obviously, whatever ownership of Columbia meant to workers,
many of them took it to mean the right to enjoy direct economic
benefit, and this message was not heard by those who had the
power to distribute such resources.
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56 Hapgood, 1934a, pp. 90-91.
57 Hapgood, 1934a, 3fn. , p. 6.
58 Council Minutes, May 8, 1933. The vote was 42 in favor, 10 opposed, 9
abstentions.
59 Telegram from the Committee of Four to the Columbia Conserve Company,
May 16, 1933; Hapgood, 1934a, 10fn., p. 12. The role and response of The
Committee of Four is an interesting one but space limitations prevent discussion
here.
60 Annual Meeting, July 19, 1940, and Auditor's Reports. Modest profits were
shown for the remaining years through 1952.
61 Letter to Stockholders, William P. Hapgood, July 26, 1937.
62 Letter to Stockholders, William P. Hapgood, July 26, 1937.
63 Hapgood was on the welcoming committee, July 23, 1937.
64 Board Minutes, August 15, 1942.
65 Auditor's Report, 1943; Vance, 1956, p. 317.
66 Part of the issue has to do with the question of the generalizability of the
Columbia experience to other businesses or, even more boldly, the prospect of
the social transformation of society through the development of workplace
democracy through the economic sector. See Douglas 1926, p. 57; Lauck 1926,
pp. 233-242; Lasserre, 1931; for different views on this issue,
67 U.S. Department of Labor, Handbook of Labor (Washington, 1947, p. 54).
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